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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The essays in my dissertation explore the impact of political action on 
everyday life by utilizing the modern theory of political economy and investigating 
the “unintended” consequences of political behavior. Specifically, the first essay 
studies the impact on communities when the Army activates reservists and 
guardsmen. The second essay challenges traditional ways of measuring 
electoral data, helping in the understanding of election campaigns. The third 
essay demonstrates the new electoral measure to ask and answer, “Did Bush 
bring home troops to bolster campaign support in 2004?” 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The essays in my dissertation explore the impact of political action on 
everyday life by utilizing political economy theory and investigating unintended 
consequences of political behavior. Specifically, the first essay studies the impact 
on communities when the Army activates reservists and guardsmen. The second 
essay challenges traditional ways of measuring electoral data, hence helping in 
the understanding of election campaigns. The third essay demonstrates the 
innovation of the second essay to ask and answer, “Did Bush bring home troops 
to bolster campaign support in 2004?”  
 My first essay stresses one unintended consequence of reserve 
mobilization. I exploit the tendency of military reservists to have civilian jobs and 
voluntary contributions in public safety by correlating emergency response times 
to vehicle accidents with data on Army Reserve mobilization. First, I find 
evidence, supported by previous literature, that suggests people who are (or 
were) members of the armed services are more likely to participate in community 
service positions. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort, I 
find that 8 percent of people ever in the military had paying jobs in protective 
services. Then, using the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the Department of Defense’s monthly 
press releases, I correlate emergency response times to fatal accidents with 
reserve mobilization data. I estimate that mobilization of reserves increases 
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response times between 2 and 44 seconds at the average. This estimate is 
probably an underestimate due to the nature of state level data. The unintended 
consequence of activating troops is important because the longer a patient waits 
for medical care, the higher the risk of death or disability. This is a hidden cost 
borne by the community when reservists are called to active duty. 
 The second essay challenges the use of ex post election outcomes as a 
measure of pre-election closeness. Using data from the US Election Atlas, I 
utilize poll data, campaign spending and state visits to develop a method of 
measuring ex ante election closeness with the goal of mimicking how campaigns 
perceive closeness leading up to Election Day. I find little correlation between my 
measure and the ex post measures used in previous literature. This suggests 
that election outcomes are endogenous with regard to campaign behavior and 
treating ex post measures as exogenous is inappropriate. 
 The third essay demonstrates how to utilize my ex ante closeness 
measure by investigating whether the Bush Administration strategically 
deactivated reserve troops to garner political support in states with close races. I 
combine my closeness measure with Department of Defense monthly press 
releases, which record unit level reserve mobilization. All results estimating 
electoral closeness must be interpreted with care. The closeness measure may 
be approximating something else that closely corresponds to state level 
differences. In this case it could merely be a coincidence of the expansion and 
contraction of reserve troops that happens during wartime. Perhaps states with 
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higher number of reserves in general are states that are battleground states, 
which correspond with returning troops.  This essay demonstrates the ex ante 
electoral closeness measure and finds some evidence that the Bush 
Administration strategically deactivated reservists in states that were closely 
contested in the 2004 presidential election. 
 I discuss the literature relevant to each essay in the individual essays to 
follow. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HIDDEN COST OF MOBILIZING RESERVES 
Introduction 
 
Mobilizing reserves removes productive individuals from local economies. 
This imposes costs on the people remaining those economies1. I quantify one 
cost by utilizing the tendencies of reservists to work in protective services. 
Specifically, I find that emergency response times to fatal accidents increase as 
more reservists are mobilized. This increase in response times is one identifiable 
cost of mobilization borne by members of the local economy. This cost is 
important because the risk of disability and death increases as response times 
increase (Athey and Stern 2002). 
The Costs of Mobilization 
 The market for reservists follows the same structure as any labor market: 
wages are determined by supply and demand. The market supply is 
characterized by people who have costs lower than or equal to the market wage. 
Assuming a lack of market failures, the personal costs (i.e., absence from family, 
risk of death, and so on) of mobilization are captured in wages and therefore are 
internalized.  
However, one must consider Title 38 of the United States Code, which 
entitles reservists to reemployment rights upon deactivation and protects 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this paper,“ mobilization” and “deployment” refer to reservists being activated to full 
time services, and “reservists” refers to Army Reserves and Army National Guard members. 
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reservists from discrimination2. This means that employers must treat deactivated 
employees as if there were no work interruption3. As a result, the market 
mechanism in the civilian labor force cannot operate freely. Specifically, wages 
cannot adjust for the probability of military activation, and reservists cannot be 
replaced upon activation. Employers must choose to hire temporary workers, 
expand their workforce (hire permanent workers and maintain the reservists’ 
positions), or simply leave the position vacant. In this sense, Title 38 disrupts 
typical market adjustments resulting in extra costs to employers. The cost may 
be particularly high when reservists are very specialized. 
 Reservists activated from the civilian protective services result in an 
internalized cost to the wage-paying organization (i.e., the police force budget) 
and an extra cost to the public served by the protective services4. This extra cost 
occurs for two reasons. First, there is no competition in protective services. 
Whereas other markets would compete away extra costs, communities generally 
are only serviced by one police force and one emergency response system. 
Second, these are specialized occupations that either are filled by “the next best 
candidate,” a temporary worker, or are left vacant when a reservist is called up. 
                                                 
2The antidiscrimination laws have an active enforcement mechanism. Steel (2004) reports about 3,800 
cases of reservists filing complaints between 2000 and 2003, with approximately 90 percent of cases 
relating to job benefit reinstatement.  
3
 Employers have the opportunity to file for exemptions to Title 38 reemployment rights. Specifically, Title 
38 states employers may not have to reemploy reservists if reemployment is “impossible or unreasonable” 
or “impose[s] an undue hardship on the employer.” 
4
 “Protective services” refers to the police force, firefighters or emergency medical service crews (EMS). 
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Additionally, communities that are serviced by volunteer emergency response 
systems may suffer greater costs as volunteers are activated because volunteer 
markets lack wage response mechanisms to attract temporary or new workers. 
 Finding a statistical link between reservists and protective service 
members suffers from the lack of data and the relatively small number of 
reservists represented in the usual person level data sets. Data regarding 
volunteer emergency responders are even rarer. The Army does not keep 
cumulative data concerning reservists’ civilian occupations. There is evidence in 
the public sector literature that public sector workers have greater tendencies to 
community service than their non-public sector counterparts (Goddeeris 1988). 
Also, Steel (2004) finds that reservists have greater tendencies to work in the 
public sector. He states, “Only 14 percent of civilian males are employed by the 
public sector, compared to 32 percent of all reservists.” His reservist data from 
2002 finds that more than 10 percent of all reservists work for local governments. 
 I turn to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort (NLSY97) 
to draw a broad connection between those who serve in the military and those in 
protective services. The NLSY97 follows a cohort that was 12-17 years of age in 
1997. Demographic summary statistics for this sample can be found in Table 5.1 
in the Appendix. There are detailed employment histories for the 8,984 people in 
this dataset.  
Approximately 5 percent of the sample enters the military between 1997 
and 2005. Table 2.1 presents yearly counts of youths in the military and 
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protective services, given that they are in the workforce. More than 8 percent of 
people who have been in protective services have also been in the military. 
Given that these numbers only reflect people in paid protective services 
positions, it is probably an underestimate. This evidence suggests at least a link 
between members of the armed services and civilian protective services. 
 
Table 2.1 Protective Services and the Military 
 
 
 
Literature and Data 
 The literature on emergency services largely focuses on accident and 
mortality rate differences across socio-economic classes by location. Emergency 
response times are generally used as controls in regressions exploring 
emergency services inputs, like emergency services budgets. It is largely 
Year Mil PS Both Labor Force Mil/Total PS/Total Both/PS
1997 3 26 0 2246 0.13% 1.16% 0.00%
1998 19 73 1 4399 0.43% 1.66% 1.37%
1999 59 102 4 5467 1.08% 1.87% 3.92%
2000 120 153 8 6489 1.85% 2.36% 5.23%
2001 156 170 8 6697 2.33% 2.54% 4.71%
2002 251 154 6 6688 3.75% 2.30% 3.90%
2003 284 161 10 6844 4.15% 2.35% 6.21%
2004 272 186 10 6709 4.05% 2.77% 5.38%
2005 51 195 9 6614 0.77% 2.95% 4.62%
1997-2005 462 641 56 8718 5.30% 7.35% 8.74%
Total Observations: 8,984
PS: People in the Protective Services
Mil: People in the Military
Both: People in Protective Services and the Military
Labor Force: Number of people in the labor force
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort 
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accepted that physical factors, like greater urban sprawl and poorer road 
conditions, lead to higher death rates (American Farmland Trust 1998; Ewing, 
Schieber and Zegeer 2003; Felder and Brinkmann 2002; Lambert and Meyer 
2006; Keeler 1994). Lambert and Meyer (2006) use response times as a 
dependent variable in a preliminary regression to support an urban sprawl theory. 
I draw on this model in developing my own model of emergency response times. 
 Empirical work about reservists falls into two main categories. First, many 
studies explore the impact of service on reservists and/or veterans. Lyle (2006) 
finds a negative correlation between standardized test scores and parental 
absence due to military service. Lyle (2006) examines all service absences, not 
just reserve mobilization. Drummet, Coleman and Cable (2003) survey the 
Sociological literature concerning generally military stressors. They conclude that 
there are three major stressors that are unique to service members that 
sociologists study: relocation, separation and reunion. Angrist and Johnson 
(2000) focus on Gulf War veterans to study divorce rates, spousal employment 
and child disabilities.  Hirsch and Mehay (2003) use the Reserve Components 
Surveys to show that reservists who have served active duty earn more than 
reservists who have not served active duty. MacLean (2005) explores the impact 
of education disruption that reservists may experience when called to duty.  In 
general, these reservist level studies focus on the impact of service on reservists 
and their families. 
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The second type of literature concerning reservists explains the 
relationship between reservists, the military and civilians. One example is 
Feaver, Filer and Gronke (2004, 208). Using surveys, they find that evidence that 
Army Reserve and Army National Guard members, “…bring military values into 
society, providing a vital source of contact between the civilian population and 
the armed forces.”  A study by Winkler et al (2004) analyzes the attributes that 
the reserve system adds to labor supply and demand. This market level study 
focuses on the mutual benefit the reserve system offers the military and 
reservists. Schrock (2004) combines Department of Defense data with Federal 
regulations to examine the current and future military practices concerning 
reservists. 
 I use two types of data: emergency response time data and mobilization 
data. The emergency response time data comes from the Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System’s Web-based Encyclopedia (FARS). These data are collected 
by the US Department of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. Each entry in FARS contains very specific information about the 
fatal accident, including emergency response times5. Data about the mobilized 
reservists were collected from the US Department of Defense website.  
 Table 2.2 contains a summary of the variables used in the state level 
analysis. The dependent variable (LN(RESPONSE)) is the natural log of the 
emergency response time to each accident.  
                                                 
5
 A fatal accident is an accident that results in a death within 30 days of as a result of the accident. 
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Table 2.2 Variable Definitions  
 
 
 
The main variable of interest is reserve density (RESDENS). Reserve 
density is the monthly number of reserves mobilized divided by the population on 
a state level and is scaled by 1,000. This measure captures how many reservists 
are mobilized with respect to the population of the state. The remaining 
independent variables describe conditions that emergency response crews 
encounter while responding to accidents. For instance, CLEAR, RAIN and 
SNOW are dummy variables indicating if the weather is clear, raining or snowing 
respectively. Other dummy variables account for the roads themselves. HW is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the road is a state or national highway. The 
dummy variable SURF represents roads that are surfaced with asphalt or 
concrete. I also use dummy variables describing the speed limit and number of 
LN(RESPONSE) Logged number of minutes for emergency response crews to arrive
RESDENS Number of mobilized reservists divided by population (in 1000s), scaled by 1000
SPEEDX Dummy Variables indicating the speed limit is X mph at the accident site
LANEX Dummy Variables indicating the number of lanes is X at the accident site
HW Dummy variable indicating the accident took place on a highway
SURF Dummy variable indicating the accident took place on asphalt or concrete
DRY Dummy variable indicatingthe accident took place on a dry surface
DAY Dummy variable indicating the accident took place during daylight hours
DARK Dummy variable indicating the accident took place during night hours
RAIN Dummy variable indicating the accident took place during rain
SNOW Dummy variable indicating the accident took place during snow
CLEAR Dummy variable indicating the accident took place with clear skies
WEEKEND Dummy variable indicating the accident occurred on Friday, Saturday or Sunday
CITY Dummy variable indicating the accident took place within city limits
RESPONSE The raw response time
RESERVES The raw number of reserves
Sources: The Fatality Analysis Reporting System and Department of Defense News Releases
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lanes at the accident site. Information concerning the city is used to construct a 
dummy variable equal to one if the wreck occurs within city limits. Also, a dummy 
variable accounts for accidents that happen on weekends (WEEKEND). 
 I limit the data to accidents with response times less than one hour6. Table 
2.3 shows the summary statistics for all observations included in this state-level 
analysis. The data set is limited to the period between October 2001 and 
December 2005 due to the limited information about reservists prior to October 
2001. The mean response time is about 9.8 minutes.  
According to the FARS statistics, most fatal accidents happen in the early 
morning hours of Saturdays and Sundays; thus it is not surprising that this 
sample has about half of all wrecks occurring on the weekend. The speed limit 
ranges between 5 and 90 miles per hour. I combine the observations that have 
speed limits greater than 70 miles per hour into one category7. The low minimum 
speed limit is a result of the inclusion of wrecks that happen in parks and other 
special jurisdictions. 
                                                 
6
 I exclude about 2,000 cases because the emergency call was canceled, but response times were reported as 
greater than an hour, in several cases they were more than 24 hours. 
7
 See Table 5.5 in the Appendix for a regression with expanded speed and lane catagories.  
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics All Observations 
 
 
 
About 95 percent of accidents occur on asphalt or concrete roads and 28 
percent of the sample happens on state or national highways. The accidents that 
happen within one hour of sunrise or sunset are categorized as “twilight” wrecks, 
and account for less than 5 percent of the sample. The dummy variable DRY 
indicates if the road itself is dry. Approximately 8 percent of the wrecks happen in 
the rain, but almost 20 percent of accidents happen on wet roads. About 2 
percent of wrecks happen in the snow. The omitted weather category includes 
wrecks that happen in fog, sleet or wintry mix.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RESPONSE 9.765 7.333 1 59
RESDEN 0.407 0.371 0.000 2.854
HW 0.284 0.451 0 1
SURF 0.954 0.21 0 1
DRY 0.814 0.389 0 1
DAY 0.514 0.5 0 1
DARK 0.442 0.497 0 1
CLEAR 0.869 0.338 0 1
RAIN 0.081 0.272 0 1
SNOW 0.025 0.156 0 1
WEEKEND 0.501 0.5 0 1
CITY 0.383 0.486 0 1
LANE 1-2 0.793 0.405 0 1
LANE 3-4 0.173 0.378 0 1
LANE 5-6 0.022 0.147 0 1
LANE 7 & Greater 0.012 0.110 0 1
SPEED5-20 0.005 0.068 0 1
SPEED25-40 0.245 0.430 0 1
SPEED45-60 0.559 0.496 0 1
SPEED60 & Greater 0.191 0.393 0 1
Sources: The Fatality Analysis Reporting System and Department of Defense News Releases
Number of Obs: 89,220
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Table 2.4 shows summary statistics for wrecks that occur within city limits. 
The average response time for this subset of observations is about 7 minutes. 
This subset has similar characteristics to the entire sample. For instance, the 
subset mirrors the total sample with about 50 percent of wrecks occurring on 
weekends. One difference the statistics reveal is that the city wrecks happen in 
areas with lower speed limits. About 25 percent of all wrecks occur in places 
where the speed limit is 40 miles per hour or less. Of the subset of wrecks that 
occur in city limits, more than 45 percent happen in low speed areas.  
 
Table 2.4 Summary Statistics for Observations Within City Limits 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RESPONSE 7.079 5.6 0 60
RESDEN 0.378 0.362 0 2.854
HW 0.342 0.474 0 1
SURF 0.975 0.155 0 1
DRY 0.821 0.383 0 1
DAY 0.480 0.500 0 1
DARK 0.479 0.500 0 1
CLEAR 0.879 0.326 0 1
RAIN 0.081 0.273 0 1
SNOW 0.021 0.142 0 1
WEEKEND 0.497 0.500 0 1
LANE 1-2 0.663 0.473 0 1
LANE 3-4 0.276 0.447 0 1
LANE 5-6 0.040 0.197 0 1
LANE 7 & Greater 0.021 0.145 0 1
SPEED5-20 0.008 0.087 0 1
SPEED25-40 0.455 0.498 0 1
SPEED45-60 0.422 0.494 0 1
SPEED60 & Greater 0.115 0.320 0 1
Sources: The Fatality Analysis Reporting System and Department of Defense News Releases
Number of Obs: 34,181
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Empirical Model 
My empirical model is based on of Lambert and Meyer’s (2006) 
preliminary model. Below is the basic regression equation: 
LN(RESPONSEi)= β1 + β2Xi+ β3RESEDENi + εi   (2.1) 
where the X vector is the wreck-specific variables discussed above. I expect β3 to 
have a positive coefficient. This would indicate that as a greater percentage of 
the state population is mobilized, the longer response times become 
proportionately. One can easily predict the signs of most of the variables. I 
expect the variables that indicate better road conditions to have negative 
coefficients (i.e., faster response times).  Therefore, I expect wrecks that happen 
on highways, in dry, clear conditions and in cities to have faster response times 
than those with opposite conditions. I expect weekend wrecks to have longer 
response times because a majority of wrecks happen in the early hours of 
weekends, which may strain the capacity of emergency response systems.  
 I also estimate fixed effects models that take on the basic form:  
LN(RESPONSEi)= β1 + β2Xi+ β3RESEDENi + µi+ εi  (2.2). 
Equation 2.2 has an X-vector of accident specific variables and reserve density 
like Equation 2.1. The main difference is that Equation 2.2 has another error term 
that accounts for the county-level differences in wrecks. This error term accounts 
for county-level sprawl because much of the previous literature relies on county-
level sprawl indices, like the one developed by Lambert and Meyer (2006).  
 
 15
Results 
 Table 2.5 displays results of estimates without monthly dummy variables. 
Column 1 reports OLS results. Column 2 shows OLS with clustered standard 
errors by county. Clustering the standard errors by county assures that standard 
errors estimates are not too small because of heteroscedasticity.  Column 3 
reports county level fixed effects, and Column 4 shows city level fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by county in Columns 3 and 4. 
The main variable of interest, reserve density, is positive in all estimates. It 
is not surprising that the coefficient is weaker in the city-only estimates. Cities are 
more likely to have non-volunteer forces and can attract new/temporary workers 
through wages.  The other independent variables show the signs expected. 
Wrecks that happen on the weekend have longer response times than their non-
weekend counterparts. Response times are shorter during clear days. Accidents 
on highways have shorter response times compared to their non-highway 
counterparts. Emergency crews respond more quickly to accidents that happen 
on roads with asphalt or concrete surfaces compared to dirt or gravel roads. The 
lane dummy variables all have negatives coefficients. This indicates that roads 
with more than 2 lanes have faster response times than their 2 lane counterparts. 
The estimates are smaller for the city fixed effects model than the county 
fixed effects or the OLS models. This is due in part to the subset of city wrecks 
having lower response times in general. For instance, in the OLS estimates, 
wrecks that occur on highways result in a -10 percent change in response time. 
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For the county and city fixed effects estimates, this drops to a -1.8 percent 
change.  
The positive coefficients on reserve density indicate that as response 
times increased as reserve density increased. Strictly speaking, the coefficient’s 
estimates on reserve density are interpreted as a one hundred percent increase 
in reserve density leads to a 10 percent increase in response times8. However, 
the maximum reserve density is less than 3. In the case of the OLS estimates, if 
reserve density goes from zero to the sample average, there is a 4.4. percent 
change in response times. At the average response time, 582 seconds, these 
results mean response times being an estimated 26 seconds longer at the 
average reserve density. Using the same technique, the estimated response 
times using county fixed effects and city fixed effects are 4 and 2 seconds 
respectively.  
  
                                                 
8This interpretation is due to the scaling of the variable. 
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Table 2.5 Dependent Variable Logged Response Time 
 
 
 
Variable
RESDEN 0.110 *** 0.110 *** 0.018 ** 0.018
[0.006] [0.016] [0.008] [0.016]
HW -0.146 *** -0.146 *** -0.076 *** -0.028 **
[0.006] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011]
SURF -0.090 *** -0.090 *** -0.158 *** -0.068 **
[0.011] [0.017] [0.015] [0.031]
DRY -0.024 *** -0.024 *** -0.037 *** -0.023 *
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.014]
DAY -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.043 *** -0.052 ***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.018]
DARK -0.005 -0.005 [0.000] -0.014
[0.011] [0.011] 0.010 [0.017]
CLEAR -0.071 *** -0.071 *** [-0.068] *** -0.063 **
[0.014] [0.016] 0.014 [0.026]
RAIN -0.071 *** -0.071 *** -0.080 *** -0.060 **
[0.017] [0.018] [0.016] [0.028]
SNOW 0.055 *** 0.055 ** 0.046 ** 0.069 **
[0.020] [0.022] [0.020] [0.035]
WEEKEND 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.030 *** 0.023 ***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008]
CITY -0.343 *** -0.343 *** -0.370 *** -
[0.005] [0.014] [0.013]
LANE 3-4 -0.144 *** -0.144 *** -0.125 *** -0.108 ***
[0.006] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010]
LANE 5-6 -0.230 *** -0.230 *** -0.157 *** -0.136 ***
[0.015] [0.027] [0.020] [0.018]
LANE 7 & Greater -0.094 *** -0.094 *** -0.065 *** -0.069 ***
[0.020] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024]
SPEED25-40 -0.045 -0.045 -0.030  -.048
[0.033] [0.041] [0.034] [0.041]
SPEED45-60 0.195 *** 0.195 *** 0.158 *** 0.163 ***
[0.033] [0.041] [0.034] [0.042]
SPEED60 & Greater 0.426 *** 0.426 *** 0.306 *** 0.313 ***
[0.033] [0.044] [0.036] [0.046]
Constant 2.181 2.181 2.324 1.836
OBS 89,220 89,220 89,220 34,181
R Squared 0.17 0.17 .16 0.05
rho - - .24 0.44
Between R Squared - - .24 0.04
Standard Errors in Brackets
Column 1 Unclustered OLS, Column 2 Clustered OLS; Clustered by County
*** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
1(OLS) 2(Cluster) 3(County FE) 4(City FE)
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The power of the model drops significantly when considering accidents 
within cities.  The coefficient on reserve density is not significant at any 
reasonable level. This may be a result of incredible variance in cities within the 
sample. For example, New York City (NYC) is given the same treatment as 
Clemson, S.C.. The city fixed effect will account for across-city differences, but 
otherwise the model assumes that a highway in NYC has the same effect on 
response time as a highway in Clemson, S.C.. This is a general problem across 
all of the estimates and results in lower R-square values. 
 For comparison, I also run a random effects model. According to Kennedy 
(1998, 227), “If the data are a drawing of observations from a large population… 
and we wish to draw inferences regarding other members of that population, the 
fixed effects model is no longer reasonable; in this context, use of the random 
effects model has the advantage that it saves a lot of degrees of freedom.” Since 
the data set is inherently a sub-sample of all wrecks, it makes sense to test the 
random effects model for consistency. The results of this are reported in the 
Appendix in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. However, after comparing the random effects 
model to the fixed effects model, which is a consistent estimator, I reject that the 
random effects model is a consistent estimator9.  
The results in Table 2.6 use dummy variables to control for month-specific 
factors. The predictions range from a non-significant city fixed effects 5 second 
                                                 
9
 See Table 5.4 in the Appendix for Hausman Test results.  
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increase to the OLS over-estimate of a 44 second increase. However, the county 
fixed effects model predicts about a 6 second increase on average.  
Adding monthly dummy variables yield higher coefficients on reserve 
density across the board. In both sets of results wrecks that occur where speed 
limits are 24-40mph are not statistically different than wrecks that happen in 5-
20mph zones10. However, wrecks in speed zones greater than 40mph have 
slower response times than the omitted category. The other results also do not 
change dramatically. For instance, the dummy variable indicating that a wreck 
happens on paved roads in the county fixed effects model has a coefficient 
indicating a -15.8 percent change without monthly effects. In the county fixed 
effects model, wrecks that happen on paved roads indicated a -16percent 
change compared to the wrecks that happen on unpaved roads.  
  
                                                 
10
 See Table 5.5 in the Appendix for extended speed and lane catagories. 
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Table 2.6 Dependent Variable Logged Response Time with Monthly Controls 
 
 
Variable
RESDENS 0.189 *** 0.0261 ** 0.023
[0.021] [0.011] [0.018]
HW -0.143 *** -0.076 *** 0.010
[0.013] [0.009] [0.011]
SURF -0.079 *** -0.161 *** -0.040
[0.017] [0.015] [0.038]
DRY -0.031 *** -0.043 *** -0.019
[0.009] [0.009] [0.014]
DAY -0.037 *** -0.045 *** -0.038 **
[0.011] 0.010 [0.019]
DARK -0.003 0.001 -0.007
[0.011] [0.010] [0.019]
CLEAR -0.070 *** -0.070 *** -0.026
[0.016] [0.015] [0.028]
RAIN -0.075 *** -0.084 *** -0.013
[0.018] [0.016] [0.030]
SNOW 0.065 *** 0.053 *** [0.110] ***
[0.022] [0.020] 0.039
WEEKEND 0.037 *** 0.029 *** 0.016 **
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008]
CITY -0.340 *** -0.370 ***
[0.013] [0.013]
LANE 3-4 -0.140 *** -0.124 *** -0.081 ***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010]
LANE 5-6 -0.228 *** -0.157 *** -0.078 ***
[0.029] [0.020] [0.018]
LANE 7 & Greater -0.100 *** -0.067 *** -0.041 *
[0.025] [0.023] [0.024]
SPEED25-40 -0.039 -0.029 -0.048
[0.040] [0.034] [0.043]
SPEED45-60 0.200 *** 0.159 *** 0.106 **
[0.041] [0.034] [0.044]
SPEED60 & Greater 0.429 *** 0.306 *** 0.239 ***
[0.043] [0.036] [0.047]
Constant 2.088 2.322 1.74
OBS 89,220 89,220 34,181
R Squared 0.17 0.16 0.05
rho - 0.24 0.532
Between R Squared - 0.24 0.06
*** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Standard Errors in Brackets
All Columns: Clustered Standard Errors by County
Month Dummy Variables Included, but not reported.
1 (OLS) 2 (FE County) 3 (FE City)
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I assert that any of these estimates are underestimates. I cannot directly 
link wrecks to specific reservists. Thus, the averages include wrecks affected by 
troop deployment and wrecks completely unaffected by troop deployment. Some 
of the estimates indicate that the response times affected by troop deployment 
are large enough to affect the overall average. If I could separate out only the 
affected accidents, I would find a stronger effect. Even a slightly longer delay 
might have a real world consequence. Athey and Stern (2002) find that a 30 
second decrease from average response times resulted in a statistically 
significant decrease in mortality. 
However, Army reservists mobilization may be highly correlated with 
another variable affecting response times. Perhaps the population make-up of an 
area is reflected by the number of reservists in general, and mobilization figures 
are just reflections of the sheer number of reservists. Another issue is 
heteroscedasticity. Using clustered standard errors prevents underestimating 
standard errors in OLS regressions. A GLS estimation is another way to deal with 
this issue, finding a correct weight for a weighted regression has not proved 
successful.  
 Because the FARS database only contains fatal accidents, there may be 
some backwards causation. Perhaps accidents are fatal because response times 
are long. Because the database does not contain non-fatal accidents, a 
Heckman selection model is not feasible. However, according to the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) the 
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average emergency response time in rural areas during 2002 was about 12 
minutes. The sample used in this study has a non-city response time average of 
10.4 over all years in the sample. The AASHTO found the response time average 
in 2002 for urban emergencies was about 7 minutes, while this study’s sample 
had a city average of about 7 minutes. Taking these facts into consideration, 
there does not seem to be evidence of a selection bias in the dataset.  
Conclusions 
 There is evidence that mobilizing reservists imposes an extra cost on the 
communities they leave. At the average reserve density, response times increase 
anywhere from 2 to 44 seconds due to mobilization. This means that decision 
makers may be miscalculating the marginal costs and benefits of mobilizing 
reserves. Specifically, the costs are underestimated, which may result in over-
mobilization. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MEASURING ELECTORAL CLOSENESS 
Introduction 
When politicians make decisions in real time, they use ex ante measures 
to determine strategy. However, many economists have used ex post measures 
of closeness to explain political behavior, namely comparative election outcomes. 
I develop two ex ante measure of election closeness and compare them with ex 
post measures of closeness. I find that my two methods are not compatible with 
ex post measures, and I argue that the ex ante measure is the more appropriate 
way to characterize political behavior. 
Previous literature on presidential behavior relies on current and previous 
election outcomes. Crain, Messenheimer and Tollison (1993) and Grier, 
McDonald and Tollison (1995) employ a typical closeness measure that relies on 
margin of victory variance, which is weighted by electoral worth. Wright’s (1974) 
closeness measure focuses on party-specific concentration within state. These 
papers, and those that build from them, share two major aspects: weighting 
closeness measures by electoral worth and any ex ante measures are based on 
the previous presidential election(s).  
There are flaws with approaches that use current and previous election 
outcomes. First, using current election margin of victory implicitly assumes that 
campaign behavior does not affect electoral outcomes or the margin of victory. 
Campaigning does affect outcomes within states. Thus, margin of victories are 
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endogenous to campaign behavior. This aspect is discussed in greater detail in 
the next section. Second, using previous presidential election information means 
treating each state’s historical voting as the main indication of future voting for all 
states. Not only is historical electoral data “stale,” but this method assumes 
states are either one party leaning or swing states.  
For example, Grier, McDonald and Tollison’s (1995) measure essentially 
picks up on historical election “noisiness” within each state. If a state is merely 
going through a change in electoral preferences by having a few electoral 
swings, the measure registers it as noise. One example of this is Wisconsin in 
the late twentieth century.  In the four presidential elections before the 1992 
election, the state switched parties three times and margin of victories were less 
than ten percent. In tradition electoral closeness measures, this would be 
measured as pure noise and considered a highly competitive state. However, 
starting in 1992 the state voted for Democrat candidates, usually in a landslide11. 
Thus, the Grier, McDonald and Tollison (1995) measure could accurately indicate 
a competitive state or simply be picking up a true party preference shift in a state 
that comes to be a stable trend in the long run. 
Third, traditional measures weigh all states based on their electoral worth. 
This makes states with large electoral votes, like California and Texas, appear to 
have great importance even if the competitiveness within the state is relatively 
low.  
                                                 
11
 The exception to this is 2000 presidential election that was won by less than 6,000 votes in Wisconsin.  
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Campaign Behavior  
Candidates make decisions based on pre-election conditions, and those 
decisions affect voting outcomes. Evidence to support this can be found widely 
across political science literature. According to Herr (2002), candidate 
appearances in states within five weeks of the 1996 presidential campaign 
secured victory for President Clinton. Holbrook (2002) studies the whistle-stop 
campaigns of the 1948 election and finds that Truman’s tireless campaign 
methods clinched the race for him, especially with regard to Ohio. There are 
many other studies that show that pre-election actions affect the presidential 
election outcomes, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to review that 
literature. Because the actions of candidates influence election victory margins 
as much as those margins influence the candidates themselves, final vote count 
is not the optimal dependent variable. The final vote count contains information 
about victory margin, but in tight races, it contains more information about the 
quality of campaigning.  
Ex Ante Closeness Measure for the 2004 Presidential Race: Method 1 
Since measuring the ex ante “closeness” of a presidential race within a 
state is not as simple as using the final vote count, I use information available to 
campaigns prior to the 2004 presidential election: poll results.  The data were 
collected from the USA Election Atlas website. The major polls include those by 
Survey USA, Capital Survey Research Center, Gallup, Mason-Dixon, 
Rasmussen, Strategic Vision and any major university poll within a state (USA 
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Election Atlas)12.  Poll data are an ideal measure for this research because poll 
numbers are carefully assembled market ventures. The Gallup Organization 
alone has over 40 offices in 27 different countries (Gallup). Using these polls is 
an obvious way to capture information the market finds important and upon which 
candidates are likely to base decisions. 
 The US presidential election of 2004 between Republican incumbent 
George W. Bush and Democratic nominee John Kerry ended with Bush winning 
286 electoral votes, carrying 50.73 percent of the popular votes and Kerry 
winning 251 electoral votes and 48.27 percent of the popular vote (US Election 
Atlas). The ex post measures suggest that the race was close, but the 
campaigns did not have this information during campaigning. The political 
science literature has much to say about ex ante measures of closeness. In 
particular, the beliefs about the usefulness of poll data are varied. Most of the 
literature agrees that poll data contains important information about the way 
people vote, but are flawed due to the gap in time between polling and the basic 
measurement issues that always plague survey data (Gelman and King 1993; 
Roll 1982). The literature disagrees about the reliability of poll data due to the 
latter issue. However, political scientists do find evidence that polls affect 
candidate behavior, therefore I utilize poll data as a component of ex ante 
closeness. 
                                                 
12
 See the complete list of polls in the Appendix. 
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Since polls are widely publicized, it seems logical that campaigns have 
easy access to this information. Specifically, I focus on how polls change. 
Changes in the polls, which will be referred to as flips, are counted based on the 
initial poll within a state. For instance, if the first poll within a state had Bush 
carrying the majority of the votes, the first poll in the timeline that had Kerry 
carrying the majority would be counted as one “flip.” Kerry is winning in the next 
three polls but then Bush is winning again in the fourth poll count as two flips in 
this state. On many occasions, the polls result in a tie. Ties are not considered 
flips but are counted as a separate phenomenon. So, if the first three polls go 
Bush, tie and Bush, there are no flips and one tie within that state. 
 One can see from Table 3.1 that some state polls had no flips at all while 
the maximum, Florida, had 13 flips. Another revealing statistic is the number of 
polls within a state. One can see from the summary statistics that some states, 
like Alaska, had as few as one poll. Pennsylvania had the most polls conducted 
at 61 throughout the election period.  
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Method 1 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FLIPS 1.47 2.96 0 13
TIES 0.92 1.78 0 8
POLLS 16.43 15.01 1 61
Source: USA Election Atlas 
Total Observations: 50
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Though the number of polls is an indication of the interest within a state, it 
is only a vague indication of the “closeness” within a state because polling is a 
business. Thus, the number of polls within a state is an indication of the market 
interest within a state, which would certainly be higher in states that are close but 
may be high in other states for other reasons. For instance, Michigan was polled 
12 times with Kerry squarely winning every single poll, while Alaska was only 
polled once with Bush squarely winning. So the number of polls is not as strong 
of an indication as the number of times the polls flipped within a state. Table 3.2 
contains a frequency table for the number of flips, and one can see that the 
majority of states had zero flips. Table 3.2 shows the frequency of flips and ties 
together, which is referred to as “changes.” 
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Table 3.2 Frequency of Flips and Changes 
 
 
 
 Taking the information about flips and changes, I can construct an 
estimation of state importance in one of two ways. First, I capture state 
importance based on flips and ties as follows: 
Importancei = f(FLIPSi, TIESi)    (3.1) 
Flips Freq. Percent Cum.
0 33 64 64
1 7 14 78
2 1 2 80
3 2 4 84
4 1 2 86
5 2 4 90
6 1 2 92
7 1 2 94
10 2 4 98
13 1 2 100
Changes Freq. Percent Cum.
0 30 60 60
1 4 8 68
2 4 8 76
4 1 2 68
5 3 6 84
6 1 2 86
9 2 4 90
10 1 2 92
11 2 4 96
17 1 2 98
18 1 2 100
Total Observations: 50
Source: USA Election Atlas 
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This means that the importance of state i is a function of the poll flips and ties in 
state i. However, I can also focus on changes, which essentially gives ties the 
same impact as flips:  
Importancei = f(CHANGESi)    (3.2) 
This method means that the importance of state i depends on flips and 
ties. Taking either Equation 3.1 or Equation 3.2 as the right-hand side of an 
equation, I can measure correlation between state-level attributes that may be 
dependent on campaign importance. For example, I can put federal spending in 
each state on the left-hand side of the equation, and find the correlation between 
state campaign importance and federal fund distribution.  
Ex Ante Closeness Measure for the 2004 Presidential Race: Method 2 
Though changes in polls within a state yield important information, 
behavior of campaigns further reveals how prized each state is. Consider the use 
of campaign resources. There is a rich political science literature concerning the 
allocation of campaign resources. In particular, the relative amount of money that 
is spent in an area affects elections outcomes (Meltzer and Vellrath 1975; 
Jackson 1997). Data concerning the amount of money spent on TV advertising 
by campaign comes from FairVote, an independent research organization. The 
scope of this data is limited to September 26, 2004 until November 2, 2004. 
FairVote collected this data from the archives of cnn.com.  
Another measure is the number of visits a candidate pays to each state. 
Again, this data is reported at cnn.com and aggregated by FairVote. Though this 
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data is compelling in regard to the “closeness” of a state, it cannot stand alone. 
As Colantoni, Levesque and Ordeshook (1975) point out, a visit to New York City 
surely impacts voters in northern New Jersey. Incorporating television ad data 
into the closeness measure without accounting for secondary effects is an 
attempt to capture the large primary effects of in-state spending. This is a result 
of an implicit assumption that if a candidate makes decisions based on the 
primary effect, not the secondary spillover effects. 
The number of visits to each state is another aspect of the closeness 
measure. FairVote also reports the number of visits to each state by the 
presidential and vice presidential candidates from September 26, 2004 until 
November 2, 2004. Again, this data are aggregated from cnn.com. This does not 
include visits to home states, as it is difficult to distinguish home state visits 
between personal and campaign motives. The primary effect is the main effect 
being captured in this data. 
 This more sophisticated importance measure includes: campaign money 
spent by state, TV ads per state, campaign visits per state, poll results by state, 
and electoral votes per state. I assume that presidential election operatives 
maximize electoral votes subject to their resources. I view campaigns as “black 
boxes” that optimize in unseen ways but are rational nonetheless. Thus, I can 
use the allocation of resources to reveal campaigns’ perceptions of critical state 
elections. As a result of this assumption, states that receive no campaign money 
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or visits are essentially ignored. A basic implication of these assumptions yields 
the following functional form: 
Importancei = f(MONi, VISITSi, POLLSi, EVi | MONi ≠ 0).   (3.3) 
The importance of state i to political campaigns is a function of the 
campaign money spent (MON), the number of visits by the candidates (VISITS), 
polling results (POLL) and the electoral worth (EV), given that any money is 
spent in the state. Electoral worth only matters when a state receives attention. If 
a state is worth many electoral votes but is heavily leaning to one candidate, its 
worth is inconsequential to campaign allocation. 
Generally, the importance of a state is used to test incumbent party action. 
Thus, Table 3.3 contains summary statistics for the 2004 campaign from the 
Republican campaign perspective.   
 
Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for Method 2 
 
 
 
One key difference between Method 1 and Method 2 is that Method 2 is 
party dependent. Thus the poll measure becomes very specific: the absolute 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MONEY 1,274,389 3,287,571 0 1.72E+07
ELECTORAL VOTES 10.7 9.618 3 55
POLL 14.64 13.785 0 53
VISITS 2.84 6.303 0 28
Total Observations: 50
Sources: USA Election Atlas, FairVote 
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value of the number of polls won by Bush minus the number of polls won by 
Kerry in each state. 
Comparisons with Past Measures of Closeness and Caveats 
I regressed the components of the Equation 3.3 on the closeness 
measure in Grier, McDonald and Tollison (1995) and found only a weak 
correlation. Specifically, the adjusted R-squared is about .18, with only money 
and visits having any significance. The results of this regression can be found in 
the Appendix, Table 5.7. This implies that my method of campaign importance is 
different from past literature. With this method of measuring importance or 
closeness within a state, economists can examine incumbent behavior toward 
specific states or areas based pre-election data. Since this accounts for 
information available to campaigns during the election, it provides a richer 
behavioral source of information that approximates the information used to make 
campaign decisions.  
One obvious drawback to this method is the data intensiveness. Also, this 
level of information is not available throughout U.S. presidential history. Because 
this is a state level analysis, often the number of observations will be limited  to 
around 50 assuming only one campaign is analyzed. Another issue that may 
arise when implementing Method 2 is collinearly. Table 3.4 contains a summary 
of simple correlations between the variables used in Method 2. The money spent 
on TV advertising by Republicans, visits made by Republicans and the electoral 
worth given Republicans gave any attention to a state are highly correlated.  
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Table 3.4 Correlation of Variables Used in Method 2 
 
 
 
Measuring ex ante importance differs from the literature in three main 
ways. First, I do not create a metric, but let estimations fit the data. Secondly, I 
use ex ante measures that would be available to the campaigns. Lastly, electoral 
worth only enters the estimation if any money is spent within a state. This 
prevents large electoral vote value from increasing the importance of states that 
have many electoral votes but receive little attention from campaigns.  
  
Variable MON VISIT EV*REP
MON 1
VISIT 0.88 1
EV*REP 0.72 0.67 1
POLL 0.29 0.21 0.33
50 Observations
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CHAPTER FOUR 
UTILIZING EX ANTE ELECTORAL CLOSENESS  
Introduction 
To demonstrate the ex ante electoral competition, I test the hypothesis 
that the Bush Administration deactivated reserve troops in states that may have 
impacted Bush’s reelection in 2004 at the margin. I use the ex ante measures of 
expected electoral vote from Chapter 3 to quantify campaigns’ perceived vote 
competition across individual states. This close wartime election gave the Bush 
Administration great incentive to treat wartime policy with an eye to win the 
presidency again. This research question is the type of question that an ex ante 
electoral closeness measure is designed to address. This paper follows in the 
spirit of Peltzman (1976) and Stigler (1971) in that it views political actions 
through the lens of political economy. Politicians are working in their own best 
interests, not trying to correct market failures.  
I am not the first to study the troop allocation with respect to voting. 
Anderson and Tollison (1991) find statistical evidence that during the Civil War, 
President Lincoln strategically sent particular units into war with the intent of 
capturing votes. In my case, the support garnered from the return of troops could 
come from two sources: the families and reservists themselves feeling grateful 
for the return, coupled with local news reporting on troops returning home, 
sparking positive responses from non-military related people within a state. 
Though Anderson and Tollison (1991) studied actual soldiers voting, current 
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election standards do not dictate that a person has to be physically at an election 
to cast a vote, so that mechanism would not operate here. Anderson and Tollison 
(1991) relied on Abraham Lincoln’s integral involvement in placing troops. While 
there is little evidence that Bush is involved in the day-to-day actions of the 
United States military, it is well known that cabinet members, including the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, are appointed by the president 
and would have incentive to keep Bush in office. The mechanism for strategically 
deactivating troops is unknown; thus I rely on correlating outcomes and not 
modeling reserve movements. 
As in any close contest, the actions of either side may change the 
balance. The Bush Administration may have brought home reserve troops in key 
states to garner votes of reservists and reservists’ families and communities. The 
mechanism operates through voters gaining more support for the war, which was 
a major issue in the campaign. Voters saw troops returning largely unharmed, 
and troops were generally in support of the war (Hodierne 2004). 
Model and Results: Method 1 
 The basic theoretical model takes the following form: 
  Reserve Mobilizationi, 04 = f(Importancei)    (4.1) 
The reserve mobilization in state i is a function of state i's importance in the 
presidential election.  As discussed in Chapter 3, Importance can be measured 
using one of two methods: poll results only or poll results combined with 
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campaign resource allocation. Using the simplest estimation of state importance, 
I estimate the following equation:  
Reserve Mobilizationi, 04 =  
β0+ β1 FLIPSi + β2 FLIPSi2 + β3 TIESi + εi. (4.2) 
where flips are the number of party lead changes in the polls in state i, and ties 
are the number of polls in state i that were too close to call. The dependent 
variable is the difference between the number of mobilized reserves in October 
2004 and the number of reserves mobilized in January 2004 in state i. The 
construction of the dependent variable makes it easy to think about the variable 
being positive if more troops left a state than returned to state and negative if 
more troops returned to a state than left a state. This seems like a logical time 
span because elections take place the first Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November. Thus, any “feel-good points” Bush might receive from bringing home 
troops would accrue prior to November. The underlying assumption is that action 
must happen near Election Day in order to have an impact on Election Day. 
The state level troop mobilization data is found at the Department of 
Defense website monthly press releases aggregate the data by state. Election 
data is gathered from the USA Election Atlas. The polls are pre-election polls that 
happen between the dates March 23, 2004 and November 2, 2004 because it 
spans the time from when Kerry essentially became the Democratic candidate 
(with John Edwards’ withdrawal) until Election Day. The poll data includes polls 
conducted by research firms, news outlets and universities. See the Appendix for 
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a comprehensive list of polls.  TV advertising spending and campaign visit data 
come from FairVote, an independent research organization. FairVote data span 
the time period September 26, 2004 until November 2, 2004 and were collected 
from the archives of cnn.com. 
The main coefficients of interest for Equation 4.2 are β1 and β2 because 
one would expect that if the Bush Administration were to bring home reservists to 
garner any type of political support, it would be for states that are close, which 
would include states with larger flip counts. If the Bush Administration was indeed 
bringing mobilized troops home in close states, β1 is expected to be positive, and 
β2 would be negative. Also, β3 is likely to be negative as ties are more likely in 
states with tight races.  
Table 4.1 displays the summary statistics for all variables used in this 
study. Some of this information is discussed in Chapter 3. However, one can see 
that by 2003, mobilized reserves represented all 50 states. I include registered 
voters and population because, as discussed below, these may be important 
control variables depending on the nature of the research question. FairVote 
reports populations from the Census Bureau and registered voter data comes 
from Statemaster (2004). The summary statistics show that on average fewer 
troops were deactivated between September and October 2003 compared to the 
troops that were mobilized between September and October 2004. Also, the 
number of reservists activated varies greatly by state. For instance in September 
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2003, Alaska had the fewest reservits activated with 35 and California had the 
most reservists activated with 6,487 
 
Table 4.1 State Level Summary Statistics. 
 
 
 
 Table 4.2 contains the estimations of Equation 4.2. The most striking part 
of the estimation is that the constant is negative across the estimations.  This 
indicates that at the average, more troops returned home than left (this general 
troop return can be seen in the summary statistics as well). The estimates have 
little power. Column 1 shows that for every Flip, about 138 reservists returned. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MON $1,274,609.00 $3,287,664.00 0 1.72E+07
VISIT 2.78 6.32 0 28
FLIPS 1.5 2.98 0 13
TIES 0.94 1.79 0 8
CHANGES 2.44 4.44 0 18
EV*REP 4.34 7.54 0 32
POPULATION 5,846,252 6.50E+06 502,816 3.56E+07
REGISTERED VOTERS 2,835,580 2.79E+06 265,000 1.42E+07
POLL 11.1 9.12 1 38
RESERVES OCT 2004 2,859.34 2,072.44 275 8,976
RESERVES SEP 2004 2,678.96 1,913.99 291 8,716
RESERVES JAN 2004 3,122.46 2,118.10 214 8,013
RESERVES SEP 2003 2,406.72 1,701.10 35 6,487
RESERVES OCT 2003 2,329.64 1,705.58 35 6,439
RESERVE MOBILIZATION 04 -263.12 1,366.73 -3,667 2,616
RES04 180.38 373.72 -278 1,811
RES03 -77.08 189.53 -890 543
RES04-RES03 257.46 469.72 -690 1,859
50 Observations
Sources: FairVote, Department of Defense Monthly Press Releases, and 
StateMaster Registered Voters 2004
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Combining this with the negative constant, it can be thought of as each flip in 
state polls correlates to 138 troops returned over and above the average, non-flip 
state experienced. Though some of the coefficients are statistically different from 
zero, there is little indication of stability. Column 3 shows expected signs for all 
variables, but once controlling for population, Column 4, the sign on ties change. 
The Adjusted R squares are very low. Taking the estimates in Table 4.1 as a 
whole, there is little indication that electoral importance had any impact on 
reserve deployment.  
 
Table 4.2 Method 1 Estimation, Dependent Variable Reserve Mobilization 04  
 
 
 
Table 4.3 repeats the same regression, except it combines the number of 
flips and ties within each state.  
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
FLIPS -138.54 ** 140.69 207.14 262.1
[62.997] [187.34] [232.752] [236.85]
FLIPS_SQ -28.24 -31.6 -38.22 *
[17.88] [31.602] [20.07]
TIES -77.8 88.831
[77.803] [158.99]
POP 0.035
[0.0305]
CONSTANT -55.31 -164.04 -153.7 -357.92
Adjusted R Squared 0.07 0.085 0.085 0.09
Obs 50 50 50 50
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
Standard Errors in Brackets
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Table 4.3 Method 1 Combining Ties and Flips 
 
 
These results give little indication that the Bush Administration 
strategically deactivated reservists in states that were closely contested in the 
2004 presidential election. The simplest regression, Column 1, shows that 88 
troops returned for each Change. Weak Adjusted R Squared values and low 
statistical significance show some evidence, but it is not conclusive or causal. 
The main problem with this method is that using poll data is only a proxy for the 
states that the candidates thought were closely contested. In reality, candidates 
make strategic moves based on what they perceive to be the swing states. A 
more accurate way to measure the candidate’s perceived closeness within a 
state would be campaign resource allocation. 
Model and Results: Method 2 
 The core of my empirical model is that the number of troops returning to a 
state depends on the importance of that state in the 2004 presidential election. I 
characterize this using the following functional form:  
Variable (1) (2) (3)
CHAGES -88.108 ** 129.35 150.64
[42.56] [121.74] [123.36]
CHAGES_SQ -15.598 * -17.701 *
[8.21] [8.45]
POP -363.33 ***
[0.03]
Constant -48.134 -184.41 -363.33
Adjusted R Squared 0.06 0.11 0.11
OBS 50 50 50
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
Standard Errors in Brackets
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RESi,04 =  
β0 + β1*MONi + β2*MON2i + β3*(EV*REP)i + β4*POPi  
+ β5*POLLi  + εi,04        (4.3) 
The difference in troops deployed between September and October 2004 
(RESi,04) is a function of the money Republicans spent in state i (MON), state 
electoral votes multiplied by a dummy variable if Republicans spent or visited 
state i (EV*REP), and a measure of polling results in state i (POLL)13. The error 
is state-time specific (εi,04 ). I include state population because I do not include 
the electoral worth of each state, one could use registered voters instead of 
population. The population measure is intended to control for state size 
differences that may influence campaigning beyond the electoral votes.  I do not 
include visits in the empirical model because money spent is correlated so highly 
with visits that co-linearity becomes an issue. 
 However, it is not enough to simply estimate the returning troops in 2004. 
There are ongoing deployments and returns of reservists. Thus, the appropriate 
measure of troops is the number of troops returning above and beyond the 
number of troops that would have returned if the election were not happening. I 
use 2003 as a control year to create a difference in difference dependent 
variable. I estimate the number of troops returning in 2003 with the following 
equation: 
                                                 
13
 The poll measure is the absolute value of the difference between polls with Kerry winning minus the 
polls with Bush winning. 
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RESi,03 = λ  + εi03       (4.4) 
The difference in troops deployed between September and October 2003 
(RES03) is a function of the state-time specific error (εi03 )  and a constant14. 
Combining Equations 4.3 and 4.4, I estimate the following equation:  
(RES04 – RES03)i = µ + β1*MONi + β2*MON2i + β3*(EV*REP)i + β4*POPi +  
β5*POLLi  + (εi ,04 - εi,03)    (4.5) 
A positive coefficient indicates that more troops were deployed (or fewer troops 
returned) between October and September in 2004 than 200315. A negative 
coefficient indicates more troops returned (or fewer were deployed) between 
October and September in 2004 than 2003. I expect β1 to be positive and β2 to be 
negative. This would indicate that money has an exponential effect: higher 
amounts of money spent correspond to more returned troops (or fewer 
deployed). I expect β5 to be negative.  The closer the poll value is to zero, the 
less competitive the state. This indicates that the less competitive polls, the more 
troops are deployed.   
Table 4.4 contains results of the OLS estimations. The signs are as 
predicted except for the coefficient on the poll measure. The coefficient is not 
significant at any reasonable level. Columns 1 and 3 are plagued by 
                                                 
14
 Since I do not know the deployment mechanism, I assume that troops are called up randomly. 
15
 If RES04 is positive, it means that more reservists were mobilized in October 2004 than September 2004. 
This means more reservists were leaving during October. If RES04 is greater than RES 03, it indicates that 
more reservists were leaving in 2004 than in 2003. This positive coefficients indicate more reserves 
mobilized in 2004 than 2003, and negative coefficients indicate few reserves mobilized in 2004 than 2003. 
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heteroscedasticity. Even using campaign resources to measure electoral 
importance does not yield any consistent results. This does not support the 
hypothesis that the Bush Administration brought home troops to garner votes.  
 
Table 4.4 Method 2, All Variables from Equation 4.5 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3)
MON 7.16E-06 2.30E-05 8.86E-05
[2.00E-05] [6.00E-05] [7.57E-05]
MON^2 -1.21E-12 -1.64E-12
[5.54E-12] [4.70E-12]
EV*REP -5.46
13.51
POLL
POP
Constant 248.329 241.9407 251.9187
Adjusted R Squared -0.01 -0.03 -0.05
Observations 50 50 50
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
Standard Errors in Brackets
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Table 4.4 Method 2, All Variables from Equation 4.5 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 These weak results may be a result of poor comparative time frames. For 
example, there were 26,300 more reserves mobilized in October 2004 than 
October 2003. If this is a reflection of changing reserve mobilization schemes, 
the differenced dependent variable may be inappropriate. Another possible 
reason for weak results is that the underlying deployment mechanism is 
unknown. Thus, the constructed dependent variable may be a poor 
approximation of troop levels changes beyond what would have been without the 
election. To see other variations of these importance components, see the 
Appendix Table 5.8. 
Because I am not modeling the mobilization mechanism and cannot prove 
causation, there may be a problem with mobilization mirroring population make 
Variable (4) (5) (6)
MON 1.01E-04 2.28E-07 8.03E-05
[6.36E-05] [7.21E-05] [6.69E-05]
MON^2 -5.81E-12 5.62E-13 -4.55E-12
[3.96E-12] [4.46E-12] [4.15E-12]
EV*REP -25.47 ** -10.68 -25.15 **
[11.87] [12.78] [11.88]
POLL 21.06 *** 7.60
[7.65] [7.61]
POP 4.73E-05 *** 4.21E-05 ***
[9.86E-06] [1.12E-05}
Constant 33.47473 62.93901 -10.63339
Adjusted R Squared 0.28 0.07 0.28
Observations 50 50 50
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
Standard Errors in Brackets
 up. To help address these concerns Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show Census region 
reserve mobilization. Figure 4.1 shows September and October 2004. During this 
time, every region had more reserves mobilized in October 2004 than September 
2004. More reserves were mobilized from 
the Northeast had the fewest reserves mobilized. These patterns are likely due to 
the traditionally strong Army recruiting in the South. 
 
Figure 4.1 Regional Reserves Mobilized September and October 2004
 
 
 Comparing the two time frames, the constructed dependent variable 
problem becomes clear. In 2004 more reserves were mobilized in October than 
September, but in 2003 the opposite is true. This suggests that subtracting the 
differences may not be the appropr
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the South than any other region and 
 
 
iate way to capture “extra” mobilization as a 
 
 result of the presidential campaign.  See the Appendix Figures 5.1 and 5.2 for 
Census Division reserve mobilization. The Census Divisions follow the same 
pattern as the Census Regions they compose. 
 
Figure 4.2 Regional Reserves Mobilized September and October 2003
 
 
Causation 
 Finding a link between pre
requires stable significant results across these regressions. Specifically, proper 
signs combined with statistic
regression techniques are required to begin drawing conclusions about pre
election behavior.  Even with significant results, t
verified for these results using this method of st
47
 
 
-election action and state electoral closeness 
al significant coefficients throughout different 
wo aspects of the data must be 
ate electoral importance
 
-
 to be 
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causal. First, the dependent variable must be uncorrelated with anything else that 
might be driving the result. For instance, if the dependent variable is correlated 
with the state population make up, it could be proxying something else. 
Secondly, the independent variables cannot be correlated with the error term. In 
the case of electoral importance, if there is error correlation, then this is merely a 
correlation estimate and cannot be called causal. 
Conclusions 
 This study demonstrates how to implement the ex ante electoral 
closeness measure explained in Chapter 3. Several difficult problems that 
researchers face when using ex ante measures of electoral competition. First, 
the timing of political action (or suspected political action), will be a matter of 
researcher discretion. The assumption of this study is that voters are affected by 
actions that take place in the month before Election Day. However, this may not 
be appropriate for all research questions. Secondly, proving causation may be 
difficult and causal estimates are evidence at best. One last issue concerning the 
ex ante measures of electoral closeness is that data may be scare for historical 
races. 
 There is no evidence concerning reserve troop deployment changes with 
respect to state electoral competition. However, this method is useful in testing 
other campaign behavior with respect to state level correlation. The underlying 
public choice theory combined with the ex ante electoral closeness measure 
allows researchers to test a number of campaign and political theories. 
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Specifically, federal allocation of funds to states, federal level voting records in 
regard to state issues, and regulations that impact states differently are just a few 
example topics that can be explored using the ex ante electoral closeness 
methods.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
The essays in my dissertation explore the impact of political action on 
everyday life by utilizing political economy theory and investigating unintended 
consequences. The first essay studies the impact on communities when the 
Army activates reservists and guardsmen. The second essay challenges 
traditional ways of measuring electoral closeness. The third essay demonstrates 
the new measure by asking, “Did the Bush Administration bring home troops to 
bolster campaign support in 2004?”  
I find that communities bear costs of activated reserves beyond the labor 
market in form of longer emergency response times. The estimates at the 
average vary from OLS estimates of 26 seconds to just over 2 seconds. These 
estimates are underestimates because the state-level data do not allow me to 
connect activated reserves to exact accidents. Even with the state level data, the 
average response times decrease as activated reserves increase. Continuing 
research about community-level costs of activating troops can help make this 
picture complete. For instance, connecting reservists to cities and counties can 
be done with time. Once these data are acquired, city and county-level accident 
data can better estimate the costs of activation. Also, the state-level reservist 
data can help detect other costs to communities. This will help identify the actual 
marginal cost of activating troops and contribute a better understanding of the 
consequences of activating reserves.  
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The second essay finds an ex ante method of valuing states during a 
presidential election. I do not create a metric, but let estimations fit the data. 
Secondly, I use measures ex ante to the election that would be available to the 
campaigns during the election. Lastly, electoral worth only enters the estimation if 
any money is spent within a state. Comparing this method to traditional 
measures of electoral importance finds the two are not compatible. My ex ante 
method of estimating election closeness can be used to better understand the 
politics of elections.  
The third essay exhibits the methods in the second essay to answer the 
question, “Did the Bush Administration bring home troops to win in 2004?” While 
there is little evidence that reservists were strategically deactivated, this study 
demonstrates the possible pitfalls of using this method. First, results cannot be 
seen as causal without proper verification. Researchers must verify that 
dependent variables are not approximating any other state level attribute. In 
particular, political action may be approximating some state level population 
make up. Secondly, there are no standard time frames to assess political action 
on election outcomes. Thus, the researcher must use his or her discretion when 
constructing dependent variables and including independent variables. Future 
research on the specific topic of reserve mobilization requires addressing some 
of the main problems with these estimations. Mainly, causation must either be 
established or the true causal link revealed. However, future research concerning 
the method of measuring electoral closeness can focus on revising past studies 
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that use ex post measures of electoral closeness as well as analyzing all types of 
pre-election political action. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 5.1 A Demographic Summary of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth  
1997 
 
  
Variable Mean Min Max
Military 0.049 0 1
Protective Services 0.07 0 1
Female 0.488 0 1
White 0.519 0 1
Black 0.26 0 1
Hispanic 0.212 0 1
Mixed 0.009 0 1
Age as of 12-31-96 13.99 12 16
8,984 Observations
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort 
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Table 5.2 Dependent Variable Logged Response with Random Effects 
 
 
Variable
RESDENS 0.031 *** 0.050 ***
[0.008] [0.012]
HW -0.085 *** -0.036 ***
[0.009] [0.010]
SURF -0.139 *** -0.025
[0.014] [0.031]
DRY -0.036 *** -0.026 **
[0.008] [0.013]
DAY -0.043 *** -0.040 **
[0.010] [0.018]
DARK -0.001 -0.007
[0.010] [0.018]
CLEAR -0.066 *** -0.055 **
[0.014] [0.026]
RAIN -0.078 *** -0.051 *
[0.016] [0.029]
SNOW 0.05 ** 0.085 **
[0.019] [0.036]
WEEKEND 0.031 *** 0.023 ***
[0.005] [0.008]
CITY -0.371 ***
[0.012]
LANE 3-4 -0.125 *** -0.107 ***
[0.009] [0.009]
LANE 5-6 -0.165 *** -0.124 ***
[0.020] [0.017]
LANE 7 & Greater -0.068 *** -0.074 ***
[0.023] [0.023]
SPEED25-40 -0.032 -0.026
[0.034] [0.041]
SPEED45-60 0.161 *** 0.186 ***
[0.034] [0.041]
SPEED60 & Greater 0.325 *** 0.323 ***
[0.036] [0.044]
Constant 2.355 1.792
OBS 89,220 34,282
R Squared 0.16 0.054
rho 0.142 0.32
Between R Squared 0.242 0.09
*** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Standard Errors in Brackets
All Columns: Clustered Standard Errors by County
1(RE County 2 (RE City)
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Table 5.3 Dependent Variable Logged Response with Random Effects and 
Monthly Controls 
 
 
 
Variable
RESDENS 0.059 *** 0.081 ***
[0.010] [0.015]
HW -0.086 *** -0.037 ***
[0.010] [0.010]
SURF -0.135 *** -0.021
[0.014] [0.031]
DRY -0.042 *** -0.03 **
[0.008] [0.013]
DAY -0.045 *** -0.042 **
[0.010] [0.018]
DARK 0 -0.008
[0.010] [0.018]
CLEAR -0.069 *** -0.057 **
[0.014] [0.026]
RAIN -0.083 *** -0.055 *
[0.016] [0.028]
SNOW 0.054 *** 0.085 **
[0.020] [0.036]
WEEKEND 0.031 *** 0.023 ***
[0.005] [0.008]
CITY -0.371 ***
[0.012]
LANE 3-4 -0.124 *** -0.106 **
[0.009] [0.009]
LANE 5-6 -0.166 *** -0.122 ***
[0.020] [0.018]
LANE 7 & Greater -0.072 *** -0.076 ***
[0.023] [0.023]
SPEED25-40 -0.032 -0.028 ***
[0.034] [0.041]
SPEED45-60 0.161 *** 0.184
[0.034] [0.042]
SPEED60 & Greater 0.327 *** 0.321 ***
[0.036] [0.044]
Constant 2.332 1.781
OBS 89,220 34,181
R Squared 0.163 0.057
rho 0.124 0.317
Between R Squared 0.25 0.09
*** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Standard Errors in Brackets
All Columns: Clustered Standard Errors by County
1(RE County 2 (RE City)
Month Dummy Variables Included, but not reported.
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Table 5.4 Results of Hausman Test Comparing Fixed and Random Effects 
 
 
  
Ho:  Random Effects Estimate is Consistent 
Ha:  Random Effects Estimates are not Consistent 
Tets Result :Chi Squared with 29 Degrees of Freedom: 305.05
Probability > Chi Squared = 0.000
Result: Reject Null Hypothesis 
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Table 5.5 Dependent Variable Logged Response Time, Expanded Variables 
 
 
       Continued on the next page 
 
Variable 1(OLS) 2(Cluster) 3(County FE) 4(City FE)
RESDEN 109.084 *** 109.084 *** 18.851 *** 10.512
[6.035] [15.454] [7.224] [13.303]
HW -0.156 *** -0.156 *** -0.100 *** -0.036 ***
[0.006] [0.012] [0.006] [0.010]
SURF -0.082 *** -0.082 *** -0.163 *** -0.059 *
[0.011] [0.017] [0.012] [0.031]
DRY -0.021 ** -0.021 ** -0.037 *** -0.019
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.015]
DAY -0.037 *** -0.037 *** -0.043 *** -0.037 *
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.019]
DARK -2.66E-04 -2.66E-04 0.002 -0.008
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.019]
CLEAR -0.061 *** -0.061 *** -0.062 *** -0.019
[0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.028]
RAIN -0.061 *** -0.061 *** -0.075 *** -0.011
[0.017] [0.018] [0.016] [0.031]
SNOW 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.049 ** 0.108 ***
[0.020] [0.022] [0.020] [0.039]
WEEKEND 0.036 *** 0.036 *** 0.030 *** 0.015 **
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
CITY -0.313 *** -0.313 *** -0.339 ***
[0.005] [0.013] [0.006]
LANE1 -0.101 *** -0.101 ** -0.038 -0.014
[0.033] [0.041] [0.032] [0.041]
LANE2 0.046 * 0.046 0.043 * 0.002
[0.023] [0.030] [0.023] [0.029]
LANE3 -0.088 *** -0.088 *** -0.042 * -0.057
[0.025] [0.031] [0.024] [0.031]
LANE4 -0.095 *** -0.095 *** -0.106 *** -0.104 ***
[0.024] [0.030] [0.023] [0.030]
LANE5 -0.148 *** -0.148 *** -0.107 *** -0.060 ***
[0.032] [0.041] [0.031] [0.039]
LANE6 -0.199 *** -0.199 *** -0.123 *** -0.119 ***
[0.031] [0.041] [0.030] [0.038]
LANE7 -0.201 *** -0.201 *** -0.102 ** -0.157 ***
[0.046] [0.047] [0.045] [0.058]
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Table 5.5 Dependent Variable Logged Response Time, Expanded Variables 
(Continued) 
  
 
  
Variable 1(OLS) 2(Cluster) 3(County FE) 4(City FE)
SPEED5 -0.775 *** -0.775 *** -0.575 *** -0.495
[0.172] [0.123] [0.168] [0.268]
SPEED10 -0.407 *** -0.407 *** -0.233 ** -0.092
[0.114] [0.115] [0.109] [0.165]
SPEED15 -0.424 *** -0.424 *** -0.278 *** -0.059
[0.060] [0.077] [0.058] [0.088]
SPEED20 -0.472 *** -0.472 *** -0.302 *** -0.071
[0.044] [0.061] [0.043] [0.065] ***
SPEED25 -0.586 *** -0.586 *** -0.377 *** -0.135
[0.017] [0.034] [0.018] [0.028] ***
SPEED30 -0.574 *** -0.574 *** -0.384 *** -0.138
[0.016] [0.037] [0.017] [0.027] ***
SPEED35 -0.481 *** -0.481 *** -0.308 *** -0.118
[0.014] [0.033] [0.015] [0.026] ***
SPEED40 -0.488 *** -0.488 *** -0.296 *** -0.088
[0.015] [0.034] [0.016] [0.026]
SPEED45 -0.412 *** -0.412 *** -0.248 *** -0.037
[0.014] [0.032] [0.014] [0.026]
SPEED50 -0.323 *** -0.323 *** -0.171 *** 0.042
[0.016] [0.035] [0.017] [0.030] ***
SPEED55 -0.211 *** -0.211 *** -0.070 *** 0.147
[0.013] [0.032] [0.014] [0.026] ***
SPEED60 -0.104 *** -0.104 *** -0.022 0.130
[0.016] [0.035] [0.017] [0.031] ***
SPEED65 -0.054 *** -0.054 *** 0.022 0.251
[0.014] [0.031] [0.015] [0.029] ***
SPEED70 0.009 0.009 0.078 *** 0.316
[0.015] [0.035] [0.016] [0.038]
Constant 2.568 2.568 2.557 1.858
Observations 89,220 89,220 89,220 33,966
R Squared
 0.176  0.176 0.169 0.065
Between R Squared - - 0.233 0.088
Rho - - 0.239 0.529
*** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Standard Errors in Brackets
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Table 5.6 List of Polls 
 
 
 
AR University Mitchell/Detriot News
ARG Montana State University
Arizona Republic Moore Information Inc.
Arizona State University Muhlenberg college
Bellwether Research & Consulting Multi-Quest
Bennet, Petts and Blumenthal Norbert College
Bluegrass Poll Portland Tribune/KOIN
Brown University Public Opinion Stratedgies
Capital Survey Research Center Quinnipiac University
Ciruli Associates Rassmussen
Consumer Logic Research 2000
Dan Jones Research and Polling Inc.
Davis Hibbits & Midghall Riley Research
Eagleton-Rutgers RKM Research and Communications
EPIC/MRI Rocky Mountain
Fairleigh Dickinson University Scripps Research Center
Field Research Corp Selzer & Co
Fox News Sienna Research Institute
Franklin and Marshal College SMS Research
Franklin Pierce Southern Media & Opinion Research
Gallup Strategic Marketing Services
Gonzales Research Strategic Vision
Hamiliton Beattie & Staff Suffolk University
Humphrey Institute Survey USA
Insider Advantage Terrance Group
LA Times Umass Poll
Lake Snell Perry University of AR
List of Polls University of Cincinnati
Marist College University of Connecticut
Market Research Insight University of New Hampshire
Market Shares Corp University of Southern AL
Mason Dixon University of Wisconsin
Merrimack College West Chester University
Minnesota State University Moorhead Wilson Research Strategies
Miss State U Zogby
List of Polls
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Table 5.7 Comparing Method 2 with Traditional Measures 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 Other Results Related to Method 2 
 
 
Variable (1)
MON 3.10E-05 ***
[1.08E-05]
VISIT -10.86248 **
[5.30]
POLL 1.615341
[1.14]
EV*REP 0.8788778
[2.79]
CONS 1.03518
Adj. R Squared 0.178
Obs 50
*** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%
Standard Errors in Brackets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
MON
MON^2
EV*REP 0.123 -15.80 * -8.36 -17.76 **
[8.99] [8.33] [8.89] [8.34]
POLL 21.05 *** 10.43
[7.34] [7.18]
POP 4.41E-05 *** 3.79E-05 ***
[9.68E-06] [1.05E-05]
Constant 256.93 68.12 60.06 -2.71
Adjusted R Squared -0.02 0.227 0.11 0.29
Observations 50 50 50 50
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
Standard Errors in Brackets
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Figure 5.1 Census Division Reserves Mobilized September and October 2004 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Census Division Reserves Mobilized September and October 2003 
 
  
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Sep-03
Oct-03
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Sep-03
Oct-03
 62
References 
 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. “Rural  
Emergency Medical Services: Section III.” Online: 
http://safety.transportation.org/htmlguides/rural/seciont03.htm (Cited 
4/1/2007). 
 
Anderson, Gary M. and Robert D. Tollison (1991) “Political influence on civil war  
mortality rates: The electoral college as a battlefield,” Defense and Peace 
Economics 23, 219 – 233. 
 
Athey, Susan and Scott Stern (2002) “The Impact of Information Technology  
on Emergency Health Care Outcomes.” Scott RAND Journal of 
Economics 33, 3, 399-432. 
 
American Farmland Trust. “Living on the Edge: The Costs of Scattered  
Development.”Online: http://www.farmlandinfo.org  (Cited 4/1/2007). 
Army Reserve Online Resources. “Role Within the Army.” Online: 
http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/MISSION/Role.htm (cited 
5/1/2007). 
 
Army Reserve Online Resources. “Business Case.” Online:  
http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/MISSION/Business+Case.htm 
(cited 4/3/2007). 
 
Cornel University Law School (2007) “US Code Collection” Title 38 Online:  
http//ww4.law.cornell.edu/uscode38/usc_sup_01_38/html  
(cited 11/1/2007). 
 
Colantoni, Claude S., Terrence J. Levesque and Peter C. Ordeshook (1975)  
“Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College,” The 
American Political Science Review, 69, 1, 157-161. 
 
Crain, W. Mark, M.N. Davis and Robert D. Tollison (1990) “An Economy Theory  
of Redistricting,” in Crain and Tollison (eds.) Predicting Politics, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Crain, Mark W, Harold C. Messenheimer, and Robert D. Tollison (1993) “The  
Probability of Being President,” Review of Economic and Statistics75,4, 
683-689. 
 
Department of Defense. News Releases October 2001-December 2005: March  
2007.  Online: http://www.defenselink.mil/ (cited 3/28/2007-5/4/2007). 
 
 63
Drummet , Amy Reinkober, Marilyn Coleman  and Susan Cable (2003) “Military  
Families under Stress: Implications for Family Life Education,” Family 
Relations 52, 279-287. 
 
Ewing, Reid, R. Schieber, and C. Zegeer (2003) “Urban Sprawl as a Risk Factor  
in Motor Vehicle Occupant and Pedestrian Fatalities,” American Journal of  
Public Health 93, 9, 1541-1545. 
 
Fairvote. “Who Picks the President” Online: http://www.fairvote.org/whopicks/  
(cited 11/7/2007). 
 
Fatal Analysis Reporting System. Accident Level Data: Online: http://www- 
fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/ (cited 3/1/2007). 
 
Felder, Stephan and Hendrick Brinkmann (2002) “Spatial Allocation of  
Emergency Medical Services: Minimizing the Death Rate or Providing 
Equal Access?” Regional Science and Urban Economics 32, 1, 27-45. 
 
Feaver, Peter D., David P. Filer, and Paul Gronke (2004) “The Reserves and  
Guard:Standing in the Civil-Military Gap Before and After 9/11,” in Barbara 
A. Bicksler, Curtis :L. Gilroy and John T. Warner (eds) The All-Volunteer 
Force: Thirty Years of Service, Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Inc. 
 
Gallup. “About Gallup.” Online: 
http://www.gallup.com/corporate/115/About-Gallup.aspx (cited 11/7/2007) 
 
Gelman, Andrew and Gary King (1993) “Why Are American Presidential Election  
Campaign Polls so Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?” British 
Journal of Political Science 23, 4, 409-451. 
 
Goddeeris, John H. (1988) “Compensating Differentials and Self Selection: An  
Application to Lawyers,” The Journal of Political Economy 96, 2, 411-428. 
 
Grier, Kevin B., Michael McDonald, and Robert D. Tollison (1995) “Electoral  
Politics and the Executive Veto: A Predictive Theory,” Economic Inquiry 
33,3, 427-440. 
 
Herr, J. Paul (2002) “The Impact of Campaign Appearances in the 1996  
Election,” Journal of Politics 64, 3, 904-913. 
 
Hodierne, Robert “Polls Shows Troops Support for War.” USA TODAY.  
December 27, 2004 Online: 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-12-26-poll_x.htm (cited 
10/3/2007). 
 64
Holbrook, Thomas M (2002) “Did the Whistle Stop Campaign Matter?” Political  
Science and Politics 35, 1 59-66. 
 
Jackson, Robert A (1997) “The Mobilization of U.S. State Electorates in the 1988  
and 1990 Elections,” Journal of Politics 59, 2, 520-537. 
 
Keeler, T. E. (1994) “Highway Safety, Economic Behavior, and Driving  
Environment,” American Economic Review 84, 3, 684-693. 
 
Lambert, Thomas. and Peter Meyer (2006) “Ex-Urban Sprawl as a Factor in  
Traffic Fatalities and EMS Response Times in the Southeastern United 
States,” Journal of Economic Issues XL 4, 941-953. 
 
Lyle, David S. (2006) “Using Military Deployments and Job Assignments to  
Estimate the Effect of Parental Absences and Household Relocations on 
Children’s Academic Achievement,” Journal of Labor Economics 24,2, 
319-350. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. and Marc Vellrath (1975) “The Effects of Economic Policies on  
Votes for the Presidency: some Evidence from Recent Elections,” Journal 
of Law and Economics: Economic Analysis of Political Behavior: 
Universities-National Bureau Conference Series 18, 3, 781-798. 
 
Mutz, Diana C (1992) “Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public  
Opinion on Political Attitudes,” Political Behavior 14, 2, 89-122. 
 
Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives. “List of  
Senators by State” Online: http://clerk.house.gov/108/olm108.pdf  
(cited 11/5/2007). 
 
Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives. “Official House  
Membership 108th Congress” Online: 
http://clerk.house.gov/108/olm108.pdf (cited 11/5/2007). 
 
Peltzman, Sam (1976) “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” The  
Journal of Law and Economics: Conference on the Economics of Politics 
and Regulation 19, 2, 211-240. 
 
Roll, Charles (1982) “Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science,”  
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 34, 4, 61-74. 
 
Stigler, George (1971) “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of  
Economics and Management Science 2, 1, 3-21. 
 
 65
Schrock, Edward L. (2004) “From the Home Front to the Front Lines: U.S.  
Reserve Forces Answer the Call to Duty,” in Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis :L.  
Gilroy and John T. Warner (eds) The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of 
Service, Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Inc. 
 
Statemaster “Government Statistics: 2004 Election: Total Registered Voters by  
State,” Online: 
http://www.statemaster.com/red/graph/gov_200_tot_reg_vot-2004-
election-total-registered-voters&ob=ws (cited 1/21/2009). 
 
Steel, Robert K. (2004) “The All-Volunteer Force: An Employer’s Perspective,” in  
Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis :L. Gilroy and John T. Warner (eds) The All-
Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service, Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Inc. 
 
US Election Atlas “2004 Presidential Election Results,” Online 
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2004&off=0&
elect=0&f=0 (cited 11/1/2007). 
 
Winkler, John D., R. Wayne Spruell, Thomas L. Bush and Gary L. Crane (2004)  
“A Continuum of Service’ For the All-Volunteer Force,” in Barbara A. 
Bicksler, Curtis :L. Gilroy and John T. Warner (eds.) The All-Volunteer 
Force: Thirty Years of Service, Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Inc. 
 
Wright, Gavin (1974) “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An \
 Econometric Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics 30-8. 
  
 66
Data 
 All data is available on disk. Contact Clemson University Libraries for 
more information. 
